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Abstract
Mutation-based fuzzing typically uses an initial set of valid
seed inputs from which to generate new inputs by random
mutation. A given corpus of potential seeds will often contain
thousands of similar inputs. This lack of diversity can lead to
wasted fuzzing effort, as the fuzzer will exhaustively explore
mutation from all available seeds. To address this, industrial-
strength fuzzers such as American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) come
with distillation tools (e.g., afl-cmin) that automatically se-
lect seeds as the smallest subset of a given corpus that triggers
the same range of instrumentation data points as the full cor-
pus. Experience suggests that minimizing both the number
and cumulative size of the seeds may lead to more efficient
fuzzing, which we explore systematically here.
We present a theoretical foundation for understanding the
value of distillation techniques and a new algorithm for mini-
mization based on this theory called MoonLight. The theory
allows us to characterize the performance of MoonLight as
near-optimal, outperforming existing greedy methods to de-
liver smaller seed sets. We then compare the effectiveness
of MoonLight-distilled seed selection in a long fuzzing cam-
paign, comparing against afl-cmin, with MoonLight config-
ured to give weight to different characteristics of the seeds
(i.e., unweighted, file size, or execution time), as well as
against each target’s full corpus and a singleton set containing
only an “empty” valid input seed.
Our results demonstrate that fuzzing with seeds selected by
MoonLight outperforms the existing greedy afl-cmin, and
that weighting by file size is usually the best option. We target
six common open-source programs, covering seven different
file formats, and show that MoonLight outperforms afl-cmin
in terms of the number of (unique) crashes generated over
multiple sustained campaigns. Moreover, MoonLight not only
generates at least as many crashes as afl-cmin, but also finds
bugs that afl-cmin does not. Our crash analysis for one
target reveals four previously unreported bugs, all of which
are security-relevant and have received CVEs. Three of these
four were found only with MoonLight.
∗This work performed as an ANU summer scholar.
1 Introduction
Fuzzing is a dynamic analysis technique for finding bugs
and vulnerabilities in software, aiming to trigger crashes in a
target program by subjecting it to a large number of (possibly
malformed) inputs. Mutation-based fuzzing typically uses an
initial set of valid seed inputs from which to generate new
seeds by random mutation. A given corpus of potential seeds
will often contain thousands of inputs that generate similar
behavior in the target, which can lead to wasted fuzzing effort,
as the fuzzer will exhaustively explore mutation from all
available seeds.
Due to their simplicity and ease of use, mutation-based
fuzzers such as AFL [32], honggfuzz [27], and libFuzzer [26]
are widely deployed in industry, where they have been highly
successful in uncovering thousands of bugs across a large
number of popular programs [4]. This success has prompted
much research into improving various aspects of the fuzzing
process, including mutation strategies [17], seed selection
policies [9], and path-exploration algorithms [31].
In addition, current research often cites the importance
of high-quality input seeds and their impact on fuzzer per-
formance [15, 22, 23, 29]. While the importance of seed se-
lection seems to be well-known [15], comparatively little
research [22, 23] has focused on the problem of optimal de-
sign and construction of corpora for mutation-based fuzzers.
Intuitively, there are several properties one might desire of
the collection of seeds that form the initial corpus:
Property 1 (Maximize coverage of target behaviors). The
seeds in the corpus should collectively span the range of
observable behaviors of the target. Fuzzers typically approxi-
mate this with code coverage, so seeds in the corpus should
collectively execute as much of the code as possible. A lack of
coverage diversity in seeds inhibits coverage testing during a
fuzzing campaign.
Property 2 (Eliminate redundancy in behavior across seeds).
Seeds that are behaviorally similar to one another (following
from property 1: that produce the same code coverage) should
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be represented in the corpus by a single seed. Fuzzing multiple
seeds with the same behavior is wasteful [23].
Property 3 (Minimize the total size of the corpus). This
reduces storage costs and results in a polynomial reduction
in the mutation search space (described later).
Property 4 (Minimize the sizes of the seeds). Contention in
the storage system should be avoided where possible. Fuzzers
are highly I/O bound [30], so smaller seed files should be
preferred to reduce I/O requests to the storage system. In
turn, this will shorten the execution time of each iteration,
achieving more coverage in any fixed amount of time.
Under these assumptions, simply gathering as many input
files as possible is not an optimum approach for constructing
a fuzzing corpus (due to properties 2 to 4 above). At the other
extreme, our assumptions also suggest that beginning with
the “empty corpus” (consisting of one zero-length file, say)
would be less than ideal (due to property 1).
The following natural questions arise: (i) How do we best
select seeds for a fuzzing corpus? (ii) If we assume proper-
ties 1 to 4 above, how should those assumptions be weighted
with respect to each other? (iii) Having generated answers to
our first two questions, does the resulting approach produce
corpora that in turn produce better results (more bugs found
in the same amount of time) than alternative, state-of-the-art
approaches?
We call the process of seed selection corpus distilla-
tion.1We assume that we already have a large candidate cor-
pus, in the form of inputs already gathered, and so we can also
explore distillation strategies that range from throwing away
all the seeds entirely through to keeping all the candidate
seeds. In this way, we can test our assumptions above.
Contributions. We propose a new method for corpus dis-
tillation that reliably performs at least as well as AFL’s
afl-cmin tool, which represents current available state-of-
the-art:
• We have designed and implemented an open-source
framework, MoonLight,2 that represents the distillation
problem as a (weighted) minimum set cover problem
(WMSCP) and efficiently computes a solution using a
dynamic programming approach. MoonLight extends
Rebert et al.’s work [23] by also quantifying the upper-
bound divergence from an optimum solution (Section 3).
• We perform extensive empirical evaluation of Moon-
Light by: (i) comparing its performance in terms of re-
ducing corpus size against a typical greedy algorithm
(Section 3.4), and (ii) testing crash and bug-finding out-
comes in a fuzzing campaign on six popular open-source
1Distillation might also be referred to as reduction or minimization. We
choose to use the same language as Pailoor et al. [22], and avoid the term
reduction since it is also used in the crash triage process to reduce crash
exemplars to a minimum size [12, 33].
2Available at https://bit.ly/2X5scV8
targets, testing MoonLight-distilled corpora against the
extreme points of our spectrum (a full corpus, and
the empty corpus), as well against the state-of-the-art
afl-cmin tool (Section 4).
• Our evaluation shows that, up to statistical significance,
and in terms of numbers of crashes generated over
campaigns, MoonLight outperforms the competing ap-
proaches: it is never worse, and is occasionally better.
• The ultimate aim of fuzzing is to uncover bugs in soft-
ware. To this end, we have triaged crashes, and deter-
mined that MoonLight not only generates at least as
many crashes, but it is also capable of finding bugs that
other approaches do not. Analysing crashes for one tar-
get we found seven bugs, of which four are security-
interesting. Indeed, three of these bugs were only found
by our tool. We have logged bug reports and received
CVEs for these bugs.
2 Background and Related Work
We begin with a brief summary of different fuzzing ap-
proaches and the literature describing them. We then focus on
the problem of corpus distillation, formalizing the problem
as it applies to mutation-based fuzzers, and then discussing
existing corpus distillation techniques.
2.1 Fuzzing
Fuzzing has become a popular technique for automatically
finding bugs and vulnerabilities in software. This popularity
can be attributed to fuzzing’s simplicity and its success in
finding bugs in “real-world” software [4,26,27,32]. At a high
level, fuzzing involves the generation of large numbers of test-
cases that are fed into the target program to induce a crash.
The target is monitored so that crash-inducing test-cases can
be identified and saved for further analysis/triage after the
fuzzing campaign has ended.
How a fuzzer generates test-cases depends on whether
it is generation-based or mutation-based. Generation-based
fuzzers (e.g., QuickFuzz [11], Dharma [20], and CodeAl-
chemist [13]) require a specification/model of the input for-
mat. This specification is then used to synthesize test-cases.
In contrast, mutation-based fuzzers (e.g., AFL [32], hong-
gfuzz [27], and libFuzzer [26]) require an initial corpus of
seed inputs (e.g., files, network packets, environment variable
strings, etc.) to bootstrap test-case generation. New test-cases
are then generated by mutating inputs in this initial corpus.
Perhaps the most popular mutation-based fuzzer is Ameri-
can Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [32]. AFL is a greybox fuzzer, mean-
ing that it uses light-weight instrumentation to gather code
coverage information during the fuzzing process. This code
coverage information acts as an approximation of program
behavior. AFL instruments edge transitions between basic
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blocks and uses this information as code coverage. By feed-
ing the code coverage information back into the test-case
generation algorithm, the fuzzer is able to explore new ex-
ecutions (and hence behaviors) in the target. In addition to
the core fuzzer, AFL also provides a corpus distillation tool:
afl-cmin. afl-cmin will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 2.3, after we formalize the corpus distillation problem.
2.2 Formalizing the Distillation Problem
Our work focuses on solving the problem of optimal design
and construction of corpora for mutation-based fuzzers. To
solve this problem, the primary question we need to answer
(as posed by Rebert et al. [23]) is:
Question: Given a large collection of inputs for a particular
target (the collection corpus), how do we select a subset of
inputs that will form the initial fuzzing corpus?
We refer to the process of selecting this subset of inputs as
distillation. In particular, we are most interested in distillation
that leads to more efficient fuzzing. As the ultimate aim of
fuzzing is to uncover bugs in software, this means producing
a higher crash yield than if we had simply used the collection
corpus as the fuzzing corpus. This is because most seeds
in a collection corpus are behaviorally very similar to each
other. Therefore it is important to distill the possibly very
large collection corpus into a much smaller fuzzing corpus,
which is the minimum set of seeds that still spans the whole
set of observed program behavior.
Previous work has formalized distillation as an instance
of the minimum set cover problem [1, 2, 23]. The minimum
set cover problem (MSCP) states that given a set of elements
U (the universe) and a collection of n sets S = {s1,s2, ...,sn}
whose union equals the universe U , what is the smallest subset
of S whose union still equals the universe U . This smallest
subsetC⊆ S is known as the minimum cover set or the minset.
Note that there may be many different minimum cover sets,
all of the same minimum size.
Each element in S is often associated with some cost (or
weight), c. In this case, the weighted MSCP (WMSCP) at-
tempts to minimize the total cost of the elements in C. Note
that the MSCP is equivalent to the WMSCP when c = 1 for
all n elements in S.
The (W)MSCP is NP-complete [14] and a greedy algo-
rithm is typically used to find an approximate solution [5].
While it is possible to use a greedy algorithm and maintain
a performance bound on solution quality [5], in practice this
bound is very large and not very useful.
Corpus distillation can thus be formalized as a (W)MSCP,
where S is a set of n seeds from a collection corpus, and
each element in S encodes code coverage information for
that particular seed. Code coverage is conventionally used to
characterize seeds in S due to the strong positive correlation
between code coverage and bugs found while fuzzing [10,
16, 19, 21]. Finding C is, therefore, equivalent to finding the
minimum set of seeds that still maintains the code coverage
observed in the original collection corpus. By definition, C
satisfies properties 1 to 3 listed in Section 1. By solving a
WMSCP, where the weights are based on individual seed
sizes, we can also satisfy property 4.
2.3 Existing Approaches to Distillation
The distillation problem in fuzzing has been tackled in a
number of different ways over the years.
Abdelnur et al. [1] introduced the idea of computing C
over code coverage as a seed selection strategy. They used a
simple greedy algorithm to solve the unweighted MSCP.
Rebert et al. [23] extended that work by also computing
C weighted by execution time and file size. They designed
six corpus distillation techniques and empirically evaluated
these techniques over a number of fuzzing campaigns. Re-
bert et al.’s findings, given their experiments, were that an
unweighted greedy-reduced distillation performed best in
terms of distillation ability, and that the PEACH SET algo-
rithm (based on the Peach fuzzer’s peachminset tool [6],
described later) found the highest number of bugs. Our paper
extends Rebert’s work with a new theory and experimental
design.
MoonShine [22] is a corpus distillation tool for OS fuzzers.
OS fuzzers typically test the system-call interface between the
OS kernel and user-space applications. As such, the seeds that
are distilled by MoonShine are a list of system calls gathered
from program traces. In contrast, our work targets file-format
fuzzing, which is a fundamentally different problem to distill-
ing system calls, and requires a vastly different approach.
SmartSeed [18] takes a different approach to those pre-
viously described. Rather than distilling a corpus of seeds,
SmartSeed instead uses a machine learning model to generate
“valuable” seeds, where a seed is considered valuable if it
uncovers new code or produces a crash.
As previously mentioned, the Peach fuzzer [6] ships with its
own corpus distillation tool, peachminset. Despite its name,
Rebert et al. [23] showed that it does not in fact calculate the
minimum cover set nor a proven competitive approximation
thereof.
Due to AFL’s popularity, afl-cmin is perhaps the most
widely-used corpus distillation tool. afl-cmin implements a
greedy distillation algorithm but has a unique approach to cov-
erage. afl-cmin reuses AFL’s edge coverage to categorize
seeds at distillation time. afl-cmin chooses the smallest seed
in the collection corpus that covers a given edge and then per-
forms a greedy weighted reduction. We consider afl-cmin
to be the state-of-the-art in corpus distillation tools and use it
as our baseline when evaluating our tool MoonLight.
3
3 Our Approach
In this section we provide an intuitive description of our
corpus distillation algorithm. A more detailed presentation
of the theory and key accompanying proofs are provided in
Appendix A.1.
Problem Definition. Recall that our fundamental task is
distillation: the removal of members of a set of seeds (a cor-
pus) while keeping the coverage of the corpus unchanged.
Our target has a finite set of edges between its constituent
basic blocks, and any given seed will cause a subset of these
edges to be traversed when the target is executed on that seed.
This seed’s set of edges is its coverage, and the coverage of a
corpus is the union of all that set’s coverages.
Following current state-of-the-art fuzzers (in particular,
AFL), we make the assumption that edge coverage is a good
approximation of target behavior, and thus: fuzzing over a
distilled corpus will discover as many crashes as fuzzing over
the original corpus. To the extent that this assumption is not
true, we are willing to forgo lost behaviors (which may lead to
crashes) in exchange for increased testing speed in the fuzzing
process. Pragmatically, we hope that this increased speed will
result in the discovery of more crashes. Empirically, this hope
is indeed borne out and discussed in Section 4.
The coverage data for a corpus can be viewed as a matrix:
each row corresponds to one seed, and each column to a
possible edge between basic blocks in the target. Such a
matrix A has Ai j = 1 if seed i causes the target to traverse
edge j, and is zero otherwise.
Our algorithm, implemented in the MoonLight tool, ap-
plies dynamic programming to take a large coverage matrix
and recursively transform it through row and column elimina-
tions into successively smaller matrices whilst accumulating
a minimum cover set C. As discussed in Section 2.2, C is the
minimum collection of seeds that still spans all the observed
edges in the target when dynamically traced. This minimum
cover set becomes our distilled fuzzing corpus to be used
instead of the original collection corpus.
We use the following notation and specify several matrix
operations to explain our method:
• S is the set of all seeds in the full corpus;
• E is the set of all edges executed by the target for each
element in S;
• N = ‖S‖ is the number of seeds in the full corpus;
• M = ‖E‖ is the number of edges in the target;
• si ∈ S is the ith seed under some ordering;
• e j ∈ E is the jth edge under some ordering;
• A =
[
ai, j
]
is the N×M corpus coverage matrix; and
• Let ci be the weight of seed si—a value to be defined but
often 1 or the file size of the seed or its execution time.
3.1 Problem
We formulate our problem as a WMSCP described as follows:
OBJECTIVE:
min
N
∑
i=1
cixi
SUBJECT TO:
N
∑
i=1
ai jxi ≥ 1, ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,M}
and
xi ∈ {0,1}, ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,N}
The objective is to find the smallest weighted set of seeds
that still covers all the columns (edges) in the matrix. An
important point to note is that this formulation assumes that
the column sums are non-zero. We term column sums that
equal zero singularities. Singularities relate to edges that have
not been traversed and hence can be safety removed from the
matrix.
The unweighted version of the problem (the MSCP, as
defined in Section 2.2) sets ci = 1,∀i = {1, ...,N}. This sim-
ply finds the smallest set of rows (i.e., the number of seeds)
that spans all of the columns. In the following presentation
we generally do not distinguish between the weighted and
unweighted formulations except where the distinction is im-
portant to the computation.
3.2 Matrix Operations
The corpus coverage matrix A is typically a large and sparse
matrix. For example, the number of seeds N in the corpus can
be of the order 105 files, while the number of observed edges
is of the order 106. Combined, the coverage matrix is in the
order of 1011 elements.
Before presenting the algorithm we need to define our oper-
ational primitives which allow us to transform the large orig-
inal problem into smaller over-lapping sub-problems. Here
we present an intuitive description of each of the operations:
a more formal presentation is made in the appendix.
We proceed with the working example in Fig. 1a to describe
our algorithmic operations.
Singularities. We define the term singularity to describe
the situation where a column or row sum is zero. Row sum
singularities are rare in practice and are pathological since
they represent seeds that do not cover any code when parsed
by the target. These seeds can simply be ignored. In contrast,
column singularities are very common. Column singularities
tend to be an artifact of the tracing tool which presumably
identified all edges in the target.
Consider Fig. 1b from the working example. Column e6—
shown in green—is a singular column. We can eliminate this
column to produce a smaller matrix A′ whose minimum cover
set C is the same as the original matrix A.
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s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
∑col 2 4 1 2 4 0 4
(a) Coverage matrix working example
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
∑col 2 4 1 2 4 0 4
(b) Singularity example
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
∑col 2 4 1 2 4 0 4
(c) Exotic row example
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
∑col 2 4 1 2 4 0 4
(d) Row dominance example
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
∑col 2 4 1 2 4 0 4
(e) Column dominance example
Figure 1: Coverage minimization examples. Rows si represent seeds; columns ei represent all possible edges. Gray elements
indicate edges that are covered by a given seed, while white elements indicate those edges that are uncovered.
Exotic Rows. An exotic column e∗ in A has a column sum
of one. An exotic row is the unique row s∗ in A that covers e∗.
For example in Fig. 1c the row s1—shown in blue—is exotic
because it is the only row that covers column e3. All seeds
associated with exotic rows are by definition a part of the final
solution and will be included in the distilled corpus.
Dominant Rows. Row dominance captures the intuitive
idea that some rows in A may be a subset of a single row. The
larger row dominates the smaller submissive row which is
a subset of the dominator. A dominant row may in turn be
dominated. A dominant row with no dominator we call primal
dominant. Intuitively, all submissive rows can be deleted from
the coverage matrix A. However, this operation is row weight
sensitive. If the submissive row has a larger row weight than
the dominator then it can be deleted else it is left alone because
it may ultimately lead to smaller weighted corpus.
Continuing with the (unweighted) working example in Fig. 1d
we identify row s5 as a dominant row—shown in red—since it
dominates rows S = {s2,s3,s4}—shown in yellow. The three
submissive rows can be deleted from the matrix.
Dominant Columns. Column dominance is a similar idea
to row dominance. In this case some columns in A may be
a subset of a single column. However, in this operation the
dominated column is deleted and the submissive columns
are left alone. The reasoning here is that any final solution
by definition will contain seeds that cover the submissive
columns and by implication they will also cover the dominant
column. The dominant column is redundant and can be safely
removed.
Continuing with the working example in Fig. 1e, we identify
column e5 as a dominant column since it dominates columns
E = {e1,e3,e4}. Note that e2 is not dominated by e5 because
of s2.
Contained Columns. When choosing row si to add to our
solution we can eliminate all the columns that si covers.
We call this operation contained column eliminations. The
columns can be safely deleted because they will be covered
by the seed associated with row si. This is a very powerful
technique for reducing the dimensionality of the problem.
Heuristic Row Reduction. Up until now the row and col-
umn eliminations that we have described have been optimal
in the sense that we have been able to guarantee that an op-
timal solution for a smaller transformed matrix can be used
to construct an optimal solution for the larger matrix. How-
ever, there are times when all optimal transformations are
exhausted and you must make a heuristic choice to select a
row to add to C. Intuitively, a good heuristic is to select the
row with the largest rowsum, since this will trigger a large con-
tained columns elimination. In the weighted case we choose
the row with with the largest rowsum/rowweight. The expec-
tation is that optimal transformations can be resumed on the
smaller matrix. We quantify our divergence from an optimal
solution in Section 3.3.1.
3.3 The MoonLight Algorithm
We now present the MoonLight algorithm. MoonLight uses
dynamic programming to accumulate a near optimal set cover
through successively applying the matrix transformations that
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we described above. The strategy is to perform transforma-
tions until the final transformation results in the Null matrix
Z and no further operations are possible.
3.3.1 Dynamic Programming Formulation
Given the set of matrix reduction operators just presented we
use a dynamic programming formulation of the problem to
compute a near optimal sequence of operations to construct
C. Dynamic programming analysis begins with identifying
the cost function of a state (coverage matrix) in terms of a
transition cost for using an operator and the subsequent cost
of the new state smaller state. This recursive function gives
the so called Bellman equation [3] for the problem.
We define the state of the problem to be specified by the
coverage matrix A. We define the cost function of the state to
measure the divergence from an optimal cover set. If the cost
function for a state is computed to be zero then by implication
an optimal cover set was computed. If the cost is non-zero
then this cost measures the divergence from an optimal cover
set. The cost of the state is defined to be the cost of any matrix
operation performed on A, denoted by d?(A,A′), plus the cost
of the subsequent state A′. Note that the cost function does
not involve a measurement of the cover set.
Clearly, we want to choose the optimum transformation for
state A. Therefore, we define the Bellman equation for the
problem as:
Cost(A) = min
i∈operators
{
di(A,A′)+Cost(A′) A 6= Z
0 A = Z
(1)
Where the indexation consists of the five matrix operations
previously specified and Z is our terminating condition. Each
of the operators produce a set of rows and columns which are
removed during the transition from A to A′.
What are the costs d? for each operation? Any optimal row
or column elimination operation has zero cost because they
contribute to an optimal cover set computation. The objec-
tive is to find an optimum set cover if possible or measure
divergence from optimality when necessary. Optimal reduc-
tions occur when minset(A) = minset(A′)
⋃
ExoticRow. We
specify these reductions to have a zero cost iff the matrix
size is reduced (i.e., A 6= A′), else they have an infinite cost
if they make the matrix larger. For example, removing col-
umn singularities and selecting exotic rows are all optimal
operations and incur no cost providing they reduce the size
of the matrix A′. In contrast, heuristic row reductions cannot
be guaranteed to be an optimal reduction. Therefore, we de-
fine the dynamic programming cost of this operation to be:
(i) one for unweighted set cover; or (ii) rowsum/rowweight
for weighted set cover.
The reasoning is this: if by chance the heuristic row choice
was optimal then before and after minsets are the same. If
it was not optimal then the before and after minsets deviate
by one seed. This cost represents an upper bound measure of
divergence from the size of the optimal choice at state A. That
is |minset(A)|− |minset(A′)| ≤ 1.
Consider the worst case, where the heuristic row choice, xh
is not part of an optimal solution. An optimal solution to A
is also a solution of the reduced matrix A′, since the columns
of A′ are a subset of the columns of A. Hence, Cost(A′) ≤
Cost(A). At worst, the inclusion of row xh increases the cost of
the solution by cxh , but reduces the cost of an optimal solution
by nothing. Hence cxh represents the upper bound divergence
from the size of the optimal choice and is the operation cost
of the heuristic reduction.
3.3.2 MoonLight Algorithm
We present MoonLight in Algorithm 1. The ordering of the
five basic matrix operations reflects the relative importance
of those operations in either dimensional reduction, select-
ing necessary rows, or computational complexity. Given that
matrix operational costs for d? are zero apart from heuristic
choice, this formulation of the algorithm is a correct encoding
of the Bellman Equation outlined in Section 3.3.1. Observe
that the heuristic row choice is the last resort option.
Algorithm 2 presents the Greedy algorithm. As can be
observed, it is simply a continuous iteration of heuristic
row choices. That is, for unweighted distillations it is the
largest rowsum and for weighted distillations it is the largest
rowsum/rowweight.
3.3.3 Implementation
We implemented MoonLight as a standalone tool in approxi-
mately 2000 lines of C++. The MoonLight tool takes as input
a directory containing (i) the seed files to distill; and (ii) for
each seed file, a compressed code coverage trace.
Because the number of seeds can be quite large, we store
code coverage as a bit vector to reduce both storage costs
and memory costs when computing minset(A). The index i of
each bit in the bit vector corresponds to a specific edge in the
target. Moreover, the i-th bit in every trace file in the corpus
corresponds to the exact same i-th edge in the target.
In addition, we provide a tool, MoonBeam, to generate these
trace files. MoonBeam is implemented in approx. 160 lines
of Python. MoonBeam converts the output of afl-showmap
(a tool included with AFL to display the coverage trace of a
particular input) to the bit vector representation previously
described. Note that the output of afl-showmap is also used
by afl-cmin.
Both MoonLight and MoonBeam have been open-sourced
and are available at https://bit.ly/2WZVynP.
3.4 Preliminary Results
We present a brief preliminary study of the performance of the
MoonLight-derived corpus compared to the commonly used
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Algorithm 1 MoonLight
function MOONLIGHT(A, X)
if isEmpty(A) then
return X
end if
Cols← Singularities(A) . Singularities
if Cols 6= /0 then
A′← RemoveRowsCols(A, /0,Cols)
return MOONLIGHT(A′, X)
end if
Rows← Exotic(A) . Exotic Rows
if Rows 6= /0 then
Cols← ContainedCols(A,Rows)
A′← RemoveRowsCols(A,Rows,Cols)
X ′← X⋃Rows
return MOONLIGHT(A′, X ′)
end if
. Primal Dominant Rows
(DomRows,SubRows)← DominantsRows(A)
if DomRows 6= /0 then
Cols← ContainedCols(A,DomRows)
DelRows← DomRows⋃SubRows
A′← RemoveRowsCols(A,DelRows,Cols)
X ′← X⋃DomRows
return MOONLIGHT(A′,X ′)
end if
. Primal Dominant Columns
Cols← DominantCols(A)
if Cols 6= /0 then
A′← RemoveRowsCols(A, /0,Cols)
return MOONLIGHT(A′, X)
end if
Rows← Heuristic(A) . Heuristic Row
Cols← ContainedCols(A,Rows)
A′← RemoveRowsCols(A,Rows,Cols)
X ′← X⋃Rows
return MOONLIGHT(A′, X ′)
end function
Solution← MOONLIGHT(A, /0) . Main
Greedy distilled corpus. We distill five different file types
(PDF, DOC, PNG, TTF, and HTML) and present the results
in Table 1. The corpora consist of proprietary sourced seeds
which are unable to be released. The corpus data in Section 4
is not proprietary.
With reference to Table 1, it can be seen that the Moon-
Light derived corpus always results in a smaller fuzzing cor-
pus than a Greedy distilled corpus, for both weighted and
unweighted scenarios. Moreover, in Table 1 we also see that
the MoonLight-derived corpus is also at most one seed away
from an optimum sized corpus. It is important to note that the
reason our MoonLight algorithm works well on corpus data is
because the coverage matrix is not random. There are strong
Algorithm 2 Greedy
function GREEDY(A)
X ← /0
while A 6= Z do
Rows← Heuristic(A) . Heuristic Row
Cols← ContainedColumns(A,Rows)
A← RemoveRowsCols(A,Rows,Cols)
X ′← X⋃Rows
end while
return X
end function
Solution← GREEDY(A) . Main
correlations between edge coverage measurements. When
tested on random matrices our algorithm performs the same
as Greedy.
These results demonstrate the efficacy of the tool and our
approach. However, they say nothing about the effectiveness
when applied to fuzzing. Therefore, we require an experimen-
tal evaluation to decide if MoonLight distilled corpora result
in better fuzzing outcomes. This is addressed in the remainder
of this paper.
3.4.1 Motivating Weighted Corpus Distillations
We expect there to be several benefits of using weighted cor-
pus distillations in fuzzing where the weights are file sizes
rather than other measures (e.g., execution times). The first
benefit is a significant reduction in the search space. The
second benefit is in the engineering effort required.
Search space reduction. Consider a file X that is N bytes
long with coverage C. Now consider a second file Y that is M
bytes long with the same coverage C.
The number of byte-limited mutations for file X is s = 2N
possibilities. Similarly, the number of byte-limited mutations
for file Y is t = 2M possibilities. That is t = s
M
N . Given this
exponential relationship in mutation possibilities in file sizes
there is a strong incentive in mutational fuzzing to find the
smallest set of small files that spans the set of observed edges.
Doing so results in a significant reduction of inadvertent and
unintended duplicate mutational fuzz tests.
Engineering. Industrial scale fuzzing involves a large num-
ber of worker processes (typically thousands) campaigning
on a given target. A common architecture in this scenario is to
serve files from a centralized network attached storage device.
The result is that the performance of industrial scale fuzzers
are often I/O constrained since very high iteration rates de-
manded of each worker results in even higher I/O operations
per second to the central storage. Therefore, a weighted cor-
pus distillation, because it minimizes the total collective byte
size of the fuzzing corpus, alleviates the I/O demand on the
storage.
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Table 1: Preliminary distillation results. Each corpus is summarized by its number of files (#) and its weight (GB). A -U suffix
indicates that the result is due to an unweighted distillation, while a -S suffix indicates that the result is due to a distillation
weighted by file size.
File type Collection Optimal MoonLight-U Greedy-U Greedy-S MoonLight-S Greedy MoonLight
# # # # # # weight (GB) weight (GB)
PDF 42,056 663 664 727 1240 855 648,260 606,841
DOC 7,836 744 745 755 1009 777 1,126,046 1,071,298
PNG 4,831 94 94 145 138 104 13,730 13,251
TTF 5,666 27 27 28 31 27 1,156 1,121
HTML 69,991 409 410 581 756 530 90,062 84,925
Given these two performance considerations practical
fuzzing would seem to benefit most from using file-size
weighted distillations compared to unweighted.
4 Evaluation
This section presents an evaluation of six different corpus
design approaches which we soon describe in detail. One
technique, MoonLight weighted by file size, is shown to sta-
tistically outperform all other design techniques. However,
there are a range of other important findings we will present
based on the large number of experiments we have conducted.
4.1 Methodology
Experimental setup. We used two machines in our ex-
periments. Both machines have 48-core Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Gold 5118 2.30GHz CPUs with 512GB of RAM and Hyper-
Threading enabled (providing a total of 96 logical CPUs). One
machine runs a hypervisor (the virtual machine runs Ubuntu
16.04), while the other machine runs Ubuntu 18.04 natively.
We conducted all experiments for a particular target on the
same machine.
Sample collection. We selected six popular open-source
programs and seven different file formats to test different cor-
pus design techniques. These targets are detailed in Table 2.
The driver program used for each library is shown in brack-
ets.3 The benchmarks were selected to be representative of
real-world programs while also operating on a diverse range
of file formats (e.g., images, audio, documents, etc.).
For each file type, we built a Scrapy-based4 crawler to crawl
the Internet for 72 hours to create the collection corpus. For
image files, crawling started with Google results and the Wiki-
media Commons repository. For media files and document
files (e.g., PDF), crawling started from the Internet Archive
and Creative Commons collections. Large files (greater than
3char2svg was adapted from https://www.freetype.org/
freetype2/docs/tutorial/example5.cpp.
4https://scrapy.org/
Table 2: Fuzzing targets
Program (driver) Version File type
Poppler (pdftotext) 0.64.0 PDF
SoX (sox) 14.4.2 MP3
SoX (sox) 14.4.2 WAV
librsvg (rsvg-convert) 2.40.20 SVG
libtiff (tiff2pdf) 4.0.9 TIFF
FreeType (char2svg) 2.5.3 TTF
libxml2 (xmllint) 2.9.0 XML
300KB) were removed to satisfy AFL’s usage recommenda-
tions. We found TIFF files to be relatively rare, so 40% of the
TIFF seeds were generated by converting other image types
such as JPEG and BMP using ImageMagick.
Each collection corpus was preprocessed to remove dupli-
cate files, and files larger than 300KB.Duplicate files were
found by computing an MD5 sum of each file. The cutoff file
size 300KB was chosen as a best effort to conform to AFL
author’s suggestion about seed’s file size, while still having
enough eligible seeds in the preprocessed corpora. Audio files
larger than 1MB were divided into smaller files using FFmpeg.
In total, we collected 2,513,175 seeds across seven different
file formats. After preprocessing our collection corpus we
were left with a total of 524,891 seeds.
Fuzzer setup. Each fuzzing campaign (i.e., each fuzzing
trial per target/file-type) was conducted for 18 hours and re-
peated 30 times. We have emphasized the large number of
repeated trials here because we found, consistent with Klees et
al. [15], that individual fuzzing campaigns are wildly variant
in performance and, therefore, reaching statistically sound
conclusions requires at least this number of trials in practice.
The length of each campaign and the number of times that
they were repeated satisfy the recommendations presented by
Klees et al. [15].
AFL was configured for single-system parallelization5 with
one master and seven secondary nodes. Each target was com-
5https://github.com/mirrorer/afl/blob/master/docs/
parallel_fuzzing.txt
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piled using AFL’s LLVM-based instrumentation with Address
Sanitizer (ASan) [25] enabled. The LLVM-based instrumenta-
tion was chosen over AFL’s assembler-based instrumentation
because it offers the best level of interoperability with ASan.
The amount of virtual memory made available to each
target varied and required some tuning for effective use. All
other parameters were left at their default values.
Experiment. We evaluate six distillation techniques (see
below) against the seven targets shown in Table 2. For each
distillation technique we performed 30 distinct trials of 18
hours of fuzzing each with the same distilled corpus, using
the latest version of AFL (2.52b). In total this amounts to
1,260 individual trials and 181,440 hours of fuzzing.
We evaluate the following six distillation techniques:
Full The collection corpus without applying any distillation
other than the previously discussed duplicate removal
and size filtering.
afl-cmin AFL’s accompanying tool for corpus distillation
as described in Section 2.3.
MoonLight-U The MoonLight unweighted algorithm, as
presented in Section 3.
MoonLight-S The MoonLight algorithm weighted by file
size.
MoonLight-T The MoonLight algorithm weighted by exe-
cution time.
“Empty” seed Unlike Rebert et al. [23], we also consider a
corpus consisting of just the “empty” seed. This follows
the findings of Klees et al. [15], which “despite its use
contravening conventional wisdom”, showed the empty
seed outperforming (in terms of crash yield) a set of
valid, non-empty seeds for some targets.
In fact, for some targets we did not use a zero-sized
seed but rather a small file manually crafted to contain
only the bytes necessary to satisfy file header checks.
More details on these “empty” seeds can be found in
Appendix A.4.
Statistical tests. Current fuzzing research often lacks a sta-
tistically appropriate experimental method that accounts for
the very high levels of variance found between individual
fuzzing trials. Attention was recently drawn to this by Klees et
al. [15] and we follow their recommendations.
We employ three statistical tests: the first test (Mann-
Whitney U-test) decides if the difference between two (A/B)
empirical population distributions is significant (measured by
p-value). In our experiments we use afl-cmin as the bench-
mark for the B population and only accept significance when
p-values are less than 0.05. We benchmark against afl-cmin
because neither Rebert et al.’s tool [23] nor SmartSeed [18]
are publicly available. The second test, the Vargha-Delaney A
measure [28], decides how strong that difference is. An A/B
experiment can be statistically different when measured by
p-values but in fact the effect size of the difference may still
be weak. Effect sizes are classified into negligible, small,
medium, and large (as defined by Romano et al. [24]). The
third test is the “coefficient of variation”, which is simply
the standard deviation divided by the mean of a distribution.
It allows us to rank and compare different similar random
processes: we prefer distributions with high means and low
variance.
We use these statistics on two sources of experimental data:
Crash yield The number of unique crashes found during an
individual trial (fuzzing run);
AUC An area under the curve (AUC) measurement that
summarizes the fuzzer response over time (iterations).
The fuzzer response is the step-wise plot of cumulative
unique crashes against iteration (test number). Fig. 2
shows our fuzzer response curves.
AUC measurements are important because they “reflect that
finding crashes earlier and over time is preferred to finding a
late burst” [15].
However, what ultimately matters is the effectiveness of an
approach at finding security-interesting bugs. To this end, we
triage the crashes for one target, isolating the bugs that led to
those crashes, and analyze how effective afl-cmin and our
new approach are at finding those bugs.
4.2 Experimental Results
Our experimental results are summarized in Fig. 2 and Ta-
bles 3 to 5.
Table 3 displays the distillation results for the corpora,
which are consistent with the preliminary results in Sec-
tion 3.4. MoonLight produces superior corpora when mea-
sured against afl-cmin whether for weighted or unweighted
scenarios. Therefore, the four desirable properties of a fuzzing
corpus, as outlined in Section 1, are achieved with MoonLight
in a superior way when compared against the current state-of-
the-art (afl-cmin).
However, what ultimately matters is if this leads to better
fuzzing outcomes. Fig. 2 shows the average fuzzer response
for the seven targets. For each target, there are six response
curves shown (the average of 30 campaigns). Each curve
corresponds to one of the distillation techniques previously
described. Each plot shows the cumulative number of unique
crashes found against the test iterations. The intervals dis-
played on the right-side of each plot show the 95% confidence
intervals for the final crash yield. The confidence interval
we used is the nonparametric, bias-corrected and accelerated
(BCa) bootstrap interval [7]. Uniqueness is determined by
stack-hashing with exploitable [8].
We summarize the main findings from our experiments
in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows whether or not a partic-
ular corpus distillation technique statistically outperforms
afl-cmin, and how significant that difference is (using the
Vargha-Delaney A measure). Table 4 shows that MoonLight-
S statistically outperforms afl-cmin—i.e., it either has a
strong positive gain or has the same performance. Also clear
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Figure 2: Average unique crashes of thirty 18-hour fuzzing campaigns for each of our 7 targets
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Table 3: Comparison of corpora. Each corpus is summarized by its number of files (#); total size, summing the sizes of all
included files (MB); and the time taken to run the target over all of the files in turn (s).
Program Collection Corpus afl-cmin MoonLight-U MoonLight-S MoonLight-T
# Size(MB)
Time
(s) #
Size
(MB)
Time
(s) #
Size
(MB)
Time
(s) #
Size
(MB)
Time
(s) #
Size
(MB)
Time
(s)
Poppler 99,984 6,086.70 7,589.10 1,318 121.90 169.81 177 22.19 28.97 209 17.32 26.85 182 22.81 12.50
SoX (MP3) 99,691 409.44 8,028.28 137 3.75 9.70 7 0.30 0.59 11 0.09 0.54 9 0.47 0.13
SoX (WAV) 74,000 249.06 548.39 68 1.65 0.52 9 0.30 0.23 11 0.26 0.28 9 0.27 0.23
librsvg 71,763 744.59 9,066.77 881 17.05 233.56 159 3.65 49.42 183 2.58 47.94 163 3.18 36.67
libtiff 99,955 44.65 1,494.53 63 0.27 0.97 21 0.09 0.31 21 0.09 0.32 21 0.09 0.30
FreeType 466 3.55 18.29 73 8.68 2.87 23 3.00 0.93 23 2.92 0.92 23 3.06 0.91
libxml2 79,032 205.64 3,504.85 505 9.34 24.58 96 1.85 5.05 120 0.96 5.98 96 1.16 4.94
Table 4: Significance for each corpus distillation technique against afl-cmin when comparing unique crashes and AUC. Note:
M = MoonLight-U, MS = MoonLight-S, MT = MoonLight-T, and E = empty seed. “+” indicates that a distillation is winning
against afl-cmin, while “-” indicates otherwise. This is followed by the magnitude according to the Vargha-Delaney A measure:
“-/+”-Negligible, “--/++”-Small, “---/+++”-Medium, “----/++++”-Large. 0 indicates there is no statistical significance in that
comparison.
Program
M MS MT E Full
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C
cr
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s
A
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C
cr
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s
A
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C
cr
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s
A
U
C
cr
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s
A
U
C
Poppler 0 -- +++ 0 ++ 0 0 0 ---- ----
SoX (MP3) 0 0 0 ++++ 0 ++++ ++++ ++++ - ----
SoX (WAV) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- 0
librsvg ---- ---- 0 0 +++ +++ ---- ---- ---- ----
libtiff 0 ---- 0 0 -- --- -- 0 ---- ----
freetype 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- ---- 0 0
libxml2 -- --- 0 0 --- --- ---- ++ ---- ----
Conclusion Bad Good Depends Depends Bad
Table 5: Coefficient of variation (CV = σ/µ) for crash yield & AUC. Green cells and yellow cells denote the best performer
for each target in terms of crash yield CV and AUC CV respectively. CV= 0 happens twice with Full, and is an indication of
extremely poor yield, so we ignore these cases. Similarly, Empty finds no crashes on librsvg and so µ = 0 and we ignore this also.
Target afl-cmin MoonLight-U MoonLight-S MoonLight-T Empty Full
Crash
Yield AUC
Crash
Yield AUC
Crash
Yield AUC
Crash
Yield AUC
Crash
Yield AUC
Crash
Yield AUC
Poppler 0.26 0.43 0.18 0.43 0.29 0.62 0.22 0.56 0.61 0.67 1.89 1.81
SoX (MP3) 0.51 0.12 0.18 0.22 1.30 1.18 0.34 0.32 0.77 0.76 0 0.28
SoX (WAV) 0.98 0.44 0.90 0.66 0.92 0.82 0.75 0.37 1.01 1.08 0 0.08
librsvg 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.48 0.20 0.36 0.21 0.37 N/A N/A 1.60 1.58
libtiff 0.21 0.32 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.22 0.20 0.45 0.52 0.26 0.36
FreeType 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.43 0.45 1.59 1.69 0.58 0.58
libxml2 0.37 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.45 0.42 0.51 0.49 0.29 0.37 0.26 0.37
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Figure 2 (continued): Average unique crashes of thirty 18
hour fuzzing campaigns
from the table is that using the full corpus results in severe
under-performance. Using MoonLight-U is statistically worse
than using afl-cmin in terms of expected yield performance.
Finally, MoonLight-T and the empty corpus are hard to com-
pare: on different targets their performance with respect to
afl-cmin’s oscillates between good and bad in a statistically
significant way. Table 5 shows that using MoonLight-U de-
rived corpus tends to result in fuzzing outcomes with good
average yields and low variance. In contrast, when using the
empty corpus this is never the case: there is too much vari-
ance.
Before drawing general conclusions, we briefly discuss the
figures for each target.
In Fig. 2a (Poppler), we see that the full corpus yields twice
the number of executions compared to the other approaches.
We believe this is due to the fact a very large proportion of
seeds in that full corpus for Poppler are extremely fast to
execute (without necessarily gaining interesting coverage or
crashes). Such seeds clog the fuzzing queue, leading to low
productivity. The remainder of the curves perform similarly
both in terms of mean yield and yield variance. The empty
corpus for Poppler is also quite interesting. Initially, it does
not produce any crashes. However, after about one million
executions it performs quite well: once AFL has evolved seeds
that significantly improve coverage.
In Figs. 2b and 2c (SoX), the number of crashes is rel-
atively small compared to other targets. A highlight is the
effectiveness of the empty corpus despite having a large pro-
cess variance, as observed by the confidence intervals. We
also suspect that the relatively smaller iteration counts for
these targets mean that the fuzzing process may not have
achieved equilibrium within 18 hours.
In Fig. 2d (libsrvg), the empty corpus has a much higher
iteration count than indicated on the graph, but all of these
iterations had crash counts of zero. MoonLight-U p rforms
particularly worse on this target compared to the other cor-
pus distillation techniques. We believe this may be due to its
ch ice of larger files chosen to minimize the number of files:
the average file size in MoonLight-U’s corpus is > 17.5%
higher than the other corpus distillation approaches. We spec-
ulate that with larger seeds to mutate, many of the mutations
are functional duplicates.
The fuzzing results for the FreeTyp font libr ry have two
points of interest. Once again the mpty corpus is surprisingly
productive, though with a large varia ce. Unlike t e other tar-
gets, the full cor us is competitive. Note that full corpus only
contains 466 seeds—i.e., it is relatively small. This suggests
that distillation is only worthwhile when there are many seeds
in the corpus.
Fig. 2g (libxml2) illustrates an interesting contrast be-
tween crash yield and the AUC measure (as reported in Ta-
ble 4). While the empty corpus ends the campaign with fewer
crashes found (statistically significantly), its early successes
and greater iteration count actually mean that it is better, again
statistically significantly, in terms of AUC.
Finally, it is worth considering the results ranked by vari-
ance rather than yield. Approaches which have smaller vari-
ance are valuable because their performance is less risky. For
example, the empty corpus can give astonishingly high yields
but is also very risky because the variance is so large. Table 5
shows the coefficient of variation for crash yield and AUC for
our experiments. The highlighted coefficient of variation is
the lowest for that target, indicating the distillation approach
with the most consistent behavior.
4.3 Findings
We now summarize our findings.
MoonLight-S. Overall this technique statistically outper-
forms afl-cmin and other approaches in terms of expected
yield performance. The benefit over afl-cmin, however, was
only observed against two targets otherwise the evidence was
insignificant. This result is consistent with our theory and
the polynomial reduction in mutation search space described
earlier.
Full corpus. The full corpus technique is recommended
only when the total number of seeds is small—i.e., in the
order of hundreds or less. When there are thousands of seeds
in the collection corpus it is imperative that some form of
distillation is applied.
Empty corpus. The empty corpus is a surprising performer
on average, however, individual trials may differ wildly from
the mean. That said, perhaps it makes sense to always add
the empty seed to any fuzzing corpus and rely on the fuzzer’s
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Table 6: Triaging SoX: Number of trials that found given bugs.
Note: MS = MoonLight-S.
Bug Id CWE afl-cmin MS CVE
A 130 30 30 –
B 680 1 3 2019-8355
C 122 2 4 –
D 690 0 3 2019-8357
E 680 0 3 2019-8354
F 121 0 3 2019-8356
G 476 3 3 2017-18189
own reinforcement learning to decide if the empty seed is
valuable or not.
MoonLight-T. The performance of this distillation tech-
nique was found to be highly target dependent. For certain
targets it is a very strong performer, but an equally strong
under-performer for other targets. It would make sense to use
this strategy if you plan a long campaign and have time to do
some trials against the target before hand. Otherwise choose
MoonLight-S.
MoonLight-U. This strategy performed slightly worse than
afl-cmin with respect to yield but demonstrated strong per-
formance with respect to variance. MoonLight-U is the most
consistent corpus for most of the targets. In most cases (SoX
on WAV files, FreeType, and libxml2) where it did not achieve
the lowest coefficient of variation, its score is comparable to
the other distillation techniques. A conservative fuzzing cam-
paign where variance minimization is more important than
expected yield returns would benefit by using this distillation
technique.
4.4 Triage
We have already presented sufficient data to answer the re-
search questions raised in Section 1. Ultimately, however, the
ideal performance measure for fuzzers is the number of dis-
tinct bugs that fuzzers find [15], and so we debug the crashes
from one target (SoX on MP3 files). We find seven bugs,
some of them security-interesting. Of these seven, one was
previously reported (CVE-2017-18189). Time and space con-
straints prevented us from analyzing the remaining targets.
Since we have established that MoonLight-S outperforms
afl-cmin, we compare just those two distillation techniques.
Collectively for this target, seven unique bugs were found
which we label A–G:
A Overlapping source and destination addresses;
B Integer overflow causes improper allocation on heap
buffer;
C Heap buffer overflow in a 3rd party library used by SoX
(libmad), due to malformed arguments passed;
D Integer overflow causes failed memory allocation;
E Integer overflow causes failed memory allocation;
F Stack buffer bounds violation; and
G Null pointer dereference (previously reported CVE-2017-
18189).
The counts for how many times each bug was found within
the 30 campaigns of our experiments appear in Table 6. In par-
ticular, note that the MoonLight-distilled corpus finds three
bugs (D–F) (three times each) that afl-cmin does not. We
have reported and received CVEs for four of the vulnerabili-
ties.
5 Conclusions
Our premise is that the choice of fuzzing corpus is a critical
decision made before a fuzzing campaign begins. This work
provides ample confirmation that this is indeed the case.
We have performed extensive experiments (20.7 CPU-years
worth) to produce findings that have a strong statistical sup-
port for our claims. On the basis of theoretical reasoning
about mutation-based fuzzing, we developed a near-optimal
algorithm for the weighted minimum set cover problem. We
further predicted that distillation using file size weighting
would significantly reduce the mutation search space and
result in more effective fuzzing. This was shown to be the
case. Indeed, we outperform the current state-of-the-art tool,
afl-cmin, when we distill by file sizes. Our tool, MoonLight,
has been open-sourced along with some of our collection
corpus trace data 6 and the MoonBeam coverage tracing tool.
We add to the knowledge of how to perform effective
fuzzing in practice:
• Maximizing fuzzing yield is achieved by using
MoonLight-S (weighted by file sizes).
• Minimum variance fuzzing is achieved through the use
of MoonLight-U (unweighted distillations).
• Avoid fuzzing with a large collection corpus—i.e., on
the order of a thousand files or more. Conversely, if the
collection corpus is small, then distillation is not helpful.
We also triaged the crashes from one of our targets, finding
seven bugs, five of which were security-interesting, and four
that are new. Moreover, MoonLight-S’s corpus led to the
discovery of three security-interesting bugs that the afl-cmin
corpus did not find. We have reported all four new bugs and
received CVEs for them.
Future work. Some of our experiments raise new questions
in response to observed unexpected behaviors. For example,
the performance of the empty corpus and the corpus distilled
by execution times show unexpected volatility. Depending
on the target, these approaches can show outstanding perfor-
mance or the opposite. The reasons are unclear and require
further investigation. It would be valuable to practitioners to
know a priori to campaigning if these approaches would be
effective.
6Available at https://bit.ly/2JJfffY
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A Appendices
A.1 Moonlight Theory
Problem Definition. Recall that our target has a finite set
of edges between its constituent basic blocks, and any given
seed will cause a subset of these edges to be traversed when
the target is executed on that seed. This seed’s set of edges is
its coverage, and the coverage of a corpus is the union of all
that set’s coverages.
Our algorithm applies dynamic programming to take a large
coverage matrix and recursively transform it through row and
column eliminations into successively smaller matrices whilst
accumulating a minimum cover set C.
What follows is an elaboration of the key theoretical ideas
that support our algorithm along with relevant supporting
proofs. Firstly, we extend the notation defined in Section 3
with the following:
• ai, j = I[seed i uses edge j] where I is the indicator func-
tion; and
• xi = I[siin the computed solution] be the decision vector
for seeds that describes a solution.
A.2 Matrix Operations
Before presenting the dynamic programming formulation and
solution for this problem we need to define our operational
primitives which allow us to transform the large original prob-
lem into smaller over-lapping sub-problems.
We introduce our basic operations as follows:
• ρ denotes a subset of rows S in A;
• κ denotes a subset of columns B in A;
• A′ = A\rowρ denotes the matrix A with the rows ρ re-
moved. We term this row elimination;
• A′ = A\col κ denotes the matrix A with the columns κ
removed. We term this column elimination;
• Function ∆(A,ρ,κ) = A\rowρ\col κ, which is the matrix
A with rows ρ and columns κ eliminated. We term this a
matrix reduction; and
• minset(A) is the size of the minimum cover set of matrix
A.
We proceed with the working example in Fig. 1a to describe
our algorithmic operations.
Singularities. We define the term singularity to describe
the situation where a column or row sum is zero. Additionally,
we define the following:
• Let κθ= θ(A) be the set of all singular columns of matrix
A; and
• Let A′ = A\col κθ be the matrix A with the column sin-
gularities removed.
LEMMA: The matrix A′ = A\col κθ has the same minimum
cover set as A. That is, minset(A) = minset(A′).
PROOF: Let the set of columns of A′ be κ′ and the set of
columns of A be κ. Therefore κ= κ′
⋃
κθ. However no row
exists that covers any column in κθ otherwise the column
would not be singular. So any minimum cover set of A does
not cover columns κθ and so κθ is superfluous to the compu-
tation. Therefore any minimum cover set of A must also be a
minimum cover set of A′.
Consider Fig. 1b from the working example. Column e6
highlighted in red is a singular column. We can eliminate this
column to produce a smaller matrix A′ whose minimum cover
set is the same as the original matrix A.
Exotic Rows. An exotic column e∗ in A has a column sum
of one. An exotic row is the unique row s∗ in A that covers e∗.
For example in Fig. 1c the row s1 is exotic because it is the
only row that covers column e3.
LEMMA: An exotic row is a member of any minimum cover
set.
PROOF: Almost by definition. Any minimum cover set of
A must include rows that cover all the non-singular columns.
An exotic row uniquely covers at least one exotic column in
A which forces its selection as a member of a minimum cover
set.
• Let Sχ be the set of all exotic rows in A; and
• Let A′ = A\row Sχ.
LEMMA: minset(A) = minset(A′)+‖Sχ‖
PROOF: Let si be an exotic row in A. Therefore si ∈ Sχ
by definition. For convenience let x = minset(A) and y =
minset(A′). Therefore x= y+1 since si must be in the optimal
cover set and A and A′ differ by only one row: the exotic row
si. By induction for all rows in Sχ the lemma follows.
Dominant Rows. Row dominance captures the intuitive
idea that some rows in A may be a subset of a single row. We
will need to consider row weights in this operation. We make
this notion more precise as follows:
• Let sα be a row that covers the set of columns α⊆ E;
• Let sβ be a row that covers the set of columns β⊆ α;
• We say that sα dominates sβ;
• We say that sβ submits to sα;
• If s∗α has no dominators then we call it a primal domina-
tor;
• Let w∗α be the weight of s∗α;
• Let Sλ be the set of all rows that are dominated by s∗α
and whose individual row weights are less than or equal
to s∗α. We say that Sλ is a submissive set of rows; and
• Let A′=A\row Sλ be the matrix with the submissive rows
from A removed.
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Continuing with the (unweighted) working example in ??
we identify row s5 as a dominant row—shown in red—since
it dominates rows Sλ = {s2,s3,s4}—shown in yellow.
In the case of unweighted distillations, row dominance and
submission strictly captures the idea that submissive rows are
a proper subset cover of a dominant row. In the weighted case
only rows that are a proper subset of a dominator and have a
larger weight then the dominator can be removed. Submissive
rows with a smaller weight could in principle be combined
with another row whose combined weight is less than the
dominant row and therefore should not be removed.
LEMMA: minset(A′) = minset(A)
PROOF: For convenience let x = minset(A) and y =
minset(A′). Since A contains the primal dominator row s∗α
none of the submissive rows in Sλ can be in the weighted min-
imum cover set. If they were we could remove them to make
a smaller weighted cover set giving a contradiction. Therefore
x does not count the submissive rows. Additionally, A′ does
not contain the submissive rows since they were eliminated.
Therefore y could not include a count of these rows. All else
is equal so the lemma follows.
Eliminating a submissive row set allows us to transform a
larger matrix into a smaller one. It is a very effective dimen-
sional reduction technique in practice. The fact that weighted
row eliminations do not remove as many rows as the un-
weighted case will explain why weighted minimum cover
sets are usually larger (i.e., have more seeds) than unweighted
ones.
Dominant Columns. Column dominance is a similar idea
to row dominance. In this case some columns in A may be a
subset of a single column.
• Let eα be a column that covers the set of rows α⊆ S;
• Let eβ be a column that covers the set of rows β⊆ α;
• We say that eα dominates eβ;
• We say that eβ submits to eα;
• Let Eµ be the set of all columns dominated by column
eα; and
• Let A′ = A\col eα.
Continuing with the working example in Fig. 1e we identify
column e5 as a dominant column since it dominates columns
Eµ = {e1,e3,e4}. Note that e2 is not dominated by e5 because
of s2.
LEMMA: minset(A′) = minset(A)
PROOF: The minimum cover set S∗(A) must contain seeds
which cover all of Sα. However any seed that covers a column
in Sα must also cover eα since eα is a dominant column.
Therefore any minimum cover set of A′ = A\col eα is also
going to be a minimum cover set of A since the dominant
column is redundant in this case.
Eliminating dominant columns when they exist is an ef-
fective dimensional reduction technique that comes with no
penalty.
Contained Columns. When choosing row si to add to our
solution we can eliminate all the columns that si covers.
• Let Si be all the columns in A that si covers;
• Let A′ = A\row si; and
• Let A′′ = A′ \col Si.
LEMMA: minset(A)−minset(A′′)≤ 1
PROOF: For convenience let x = minset(A) and y =
minset(A′). Now there are two cases: if the selected row
elimination is an optimal elimination then x = y. If the se-
lected row that was eliminated is not a member of a mini-
mum cover set then x = y+1. When we remove the columns
Si we know that si covers them. Therefore these columns
are no longer needed in calculating the solution. Therefore
minset(A′′) = minset(A′) = y. Therefore x− y ≤ 1 and the
lemma follows.
We call this operation contained column eliminations.
Again it is a very powerful technique for reducing the di-
mensionality of the problem.
Heuristic Row Reduction. So far the row and column elim-
inations that we have described have been optimal in the sense
that we have been able to guarantee that an optimal solution
for a smaller transformed matrix can be used to construct an
optimal solution for the larger matrix.
There are times when you exhaust all optimal transforma-
tions and you need to make a heuristic choice.
Intuitively, a good choice is to select the row with the largest
rowsum since it will trigger a large contained columns elimi-
nation. In the weighted case we choose the row with with the
largest rowsum/rowweight.
The expectation is that optimal transformations can be
resumed on the smaller matrix.
A.3 MoonLight Algorithm
We now present a more formal description of the MoonLight
algorithm.
Bellman Equation. The Bellman Equation is the necessary
condition for optimality when using dynamic programming.
We define the state of the problem to be specified by the
coverage matrix A. The cost of the state is defined to be
the cost of any matrix operation performed on A denoted
by d?(A,A′) plus the cost of the subsequent state A′. Clearly
we want to choose the optimum transformation for state A.
Therefore we define the Bellman equation for the problem as:
Cost(A) = min
i∈{Operators}
{
di(A,A′)+Cost(A′) A 6= Z
0 A = Z
(2)
where the indexation consists of the five unary operations
previously specified. We also make clear that any transfor-
mation from A → A′ implicitly uses the matrix reduction
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operation ∆(·) imposed on any associated contained columns
κ=Π(·). This will be discussed momentarily.
What are the costs d? for each operation? The objective is to
find an optimum set cover for the problem. Optimal reductions
occur when minset(A) =minset(A′). We specify these to have
a cost of zero if and only if the associated row or columns
sets are not empty (that is, A 6= A′), else they have an infinite
cost. Similarly, exotic row operations are also defined to have
a zero cost even though the before and after minimum cover
sets are different. For example, removing column singularities
and selecting exotics row are all optimal operations and incur
no cost providing they reduce the size of the matrix A′.
In contrast heuristic row reductions can not be guaranteed
to be optimal reductions. Therefore we define the cost of
this operation to be the number of rows selected—that is
|ε(A)|. This cost represents an upper bound measure of di-
vergence from the size of the optimal choice at state A. That
is |minset(A′)| − |minset(A)| ≤ |ε(A)|. This is an inductive
argument: every time you choose a row heuristically it may
not be an optimal choice. Therefore counting the number of
heuristic choices measures the size of the deviation from an
optimal solution.
A.4 The “Empty Seed” Corpus
As discussed in Section 4.1, we use a small, hand-constructed
input when fuzzing the “empty seed”. For most targets, the
empty seed contains a single line-break character (“\n”).
However, for more structured inputs—e.g., SVG, WAV, and
PDF—we use a slightly more complex empty seed to assist
AFL in overcoming magic byte checks. For example, the
“empty” SVG and PDF seeds are shown in Fig. 3.
<svg></svg>
(a) The empty SVG seed
%PDF-1.7
1 0 obj
<< /Type /Catalog
>>
endobj
trailer
<<
/Root 1 0 R
>>
%%EOF
(b) The empty PDF seed
Figure 3: “Empty” seed examples
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